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Introduction
 
by Nate Schenkkan, Director for Special Research, Freedom House
PERSPECTIVES ON “EVERYDAY” 
TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION IN AN 
AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 
Transnational repression is a term used to describe how     countries silence their exiles and diasporas abroad. 
It encompasses a spectrum of tactics, from assassinations, 
to renditions, to spyware, to intimidation of exiles’ family 
members who have stayed behind. As a transnational 
phenomenon, it is inseparable from broader trends of 
globalization. States employ the tactics of transnational 
repression within patterns of international mobility and 
finance, through legal institutions that regulate migration 
and citizenship, and via digital technologies that enable 
instantaneous and constant communication across borders. 
This means that transnational repression is also embedded 
in “global authoritarianism”: the adaptation of authoritarian 
states to global capitalism and the existing international 
order following the shock of the end of the Cold War.1 Unlike 
during the Cold War, modern authoritarianism does not seek 
to shield itself from the international order but to integrate 
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with it and rebuild it from the inside.2 One of the purposes of 
this integration for states that explicitly sabotage demands 
for accountability and transparency from their citizens within 
their borders is to impose authoritarian controls upon them 
beyond their borders. Through transnational repression, 
authoritarian states seek to maintain control over diasporas 
and exiles, migrants, international students, and others, 
extending the sphere of authoritarian governance beyond 
their sovereign boundaries.
This collection of essays seeks to elaborate on the issues 
raised by transnational repression as a widespread 
phenomenon embedded within globalization. The purpose 
of the collection is to provide policymakers, human 
rights activists, and journalists with perspectives on the 
pressures that emigrants, exiles, and diasporas experience 
from their countries of origin, the lesser-known tactics 
they face, and to provoke thinking about how to address 
transnational repression.
The first and second essays explore the most widespread, 
but somewhat underdiscussed, mechanisms of transnational 
repression—what one might call “everyday” transnational 
repression, because of how ubiquitous it is. In his essay, 
Marcus Michaelsen explains the importance of digital tools in 
this discussion. All activists in the twenty-first century rely on 
digital media and tools, but exiles and diasporic communities 
are even more reliant on these due to their physical 
estrangement from their origin countries. Digital repression is 
a serious risk in an era where activists must use social media 
and digital communication tools to conduct their work, and 
where a person’s private life is fully intertwined with other 
facets of their digital existence. Even in the infamous case of 
Saudi Arabia’s murder of the international journalist Jamal 
Khashoggi, sophisticated digital spyware deployed across 
borders was an underappreciated component of the violent 
plot on his life. Michaelsen’s contribution also highlights the 
role that private spyware companies have played in enabling 
transnational repression, extending the opportunity for 
abuses to countries that would otherwise have lacked the 
technical capacity to target their enemies abroad.
In the second essay, Fiona Adamson and Gerasimos 
Tsourapas lay out a typology for understanding another 
widespread form of transnational repression: coercion-by-
proxy, or pressure on exiles’ family members, associates, or 
acquaintances who remain in the origin country. Adamson 
and Tsourapas divide coercion-by-proxy into the categories 
of punishment, deterrence, and compellence, which feed 
into “the creation of a climate of fear and control in the 
diaspora.” Such a method is “low-cost” for authoritarian 
regimes because it does not require violating another 
state’s sovereignty, and frequently escapes the same level of 
international scrutiny that other methods might attract.
In the third essay, Dana Moss elaborates on the effects 
of transnational repression on the role that exiles and 
diasporas play in support of democracy and human rights 
in their origin countries. Diaspora activists can be important 
advocates for their communities by holding their origin states 
accountable, spreading information, assisting dissidents, 
and even pressing for legal redress in international forums. 
Yet, transnational repression tactics can be effective in 
intimidating diasporas from engaging in activism. Even where 
diasporas become mobilized, often at times of national crisis, 
transnational repression techniques sow mistrust among 
groups, splintering their efforts and making coordinated 
action harder to sustain. The result, Moss writes, is that origin 
states “effectively cow the majority of the diaspora into 
silence.” In line with Adamson and Tsourapas, Moss argues 
that transnational repression is widespread because it is low-
cost in terms of political capital and actual expenditures, and 
because it works.
Finally, in the last essay, Saipira Furstenberg, Tena Prelec, 
and John Heathershaw widen the discussion by placing 
transnational repression within the larger framework of 
authoritarian influence, through an examination of the ways 
that authoritarian states are able to use higher education as a 
means to control discourse and dissent beyond their borders. 
The internationalization of higher education—in many 
ways a positive development through the opportunities it 
presents for international research, exchange, and knowledge-
sharing—also is a vehicle for transnational repression and 
authoritarian influence. International students and faculty 
Through transnational repression, 
authoritarian states seek to 
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and exiles, migrants, international 
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abroad become both targets of pressure and tools for its 
use against others, resulting in self-censorship on sensitive 
topics even among people not affiliated with the diaspora 
in question. Fieldwork in authoritarian environments can 
become a vehicle for repression that, in turn, shapes how 
the broader academic community engages with a topic. And 
lucrative satellite campuses opened in authoritarian states 
often come packaged with implicit restrictions on speech 
that, in turn, circulate back to the university’s home country. 
All of these components work together to degrade the quality 
of academic freedom on topics sensitive to authoritarian 
states that involve themselves in higher education.
As raised in this fourth essay, the enmeshment of 
transnational repression in globalization raises difficult policy-
response questions. An attractively simple solution to global 
authoritarianism would seem to be decoupling: separating 
democracies from authoritarian states, economically, 
technologically, and socially. Policy in the United States, at 
least under the current presidential administration, appears 
to be inclining in this direction regarding China.3 Some 
measures of decoupling may be valid in order to avoid 
strategic threats to democracies, such as increasing scrutiny 
of imported technology in key future infrastructure like 5G.
In examining decoupling through the lens of transnational 
repression, however, one can see how grave the human rights 
consequences of pursuing indiscriminate, security-focused 
policies of separation would be. The only foolproof way to 
protect a diaspora or exiles from targeting by their origin 
country would be wholesale disconnection, shutting down 
all means by which states reach their diasporas. This would 
require increasing state power even more to monitor what 
contacts diasporas may maintain outside of the community, 
and what means they can use to do so. Eventually, it would 
also require restricting even further the ability of people to 
move across national borders, using data collection methods 
necessitating greater and greater intrusions into privacy. 
Such a shift would also further embolden the most illiberal 
versions of ethnonationalism, with dire consequences for 
minorities and noncitizens inside democracies. Finally, 
decoupling in order to protect democracies would shut 
down the opportunity for democracies to exert influence in 
authoritarian states. The result would be a new Iron Curtain, 
abandoning those living under authoritarianism, and forgoing 
the positive changes of the post–Cold War era in international 
solidarity, international protection of human rights, and the 
spread of democratic norms and practices.
Instead, the essays in this collection point to the importance 
of deepening and strengthening solidarity across borders. 
Better defenses against transnational repression are a matter 
of strengthening and increasing connections, not cutting 
them. Building networks of support and trust, especially 
among civil society groups, strengthens the sources of 
resilience that diasporas rely on to push back against 
transnational repression. Michaelsen’s and Moss’s pieces 
emphasize the importance of longer-term interventions and 
support for exiles and diasporas in order to protect them 
against digital forms of transnational repression. Adamson 
and Tsourapas, in their essay, emphasize how transnational 
repression challenges the current country-based reporting 
of human rights groups (including Freedom House) by 
calling for more investigations based on “practices” rather 
than country studies. Regarding higher education, a group of 
parliamentarians, civil society groups, and academics in the 
United Kingdom—including those who have been subject to 
transnational repression—are working together to build a 
code of conduct to institute greater protections for students 
and faculty as well as accountability in international university 
partnerships.
States that host diasporic communities also have a role 
to play: in supporting such projects of solidarity, including 
by empowering immigrant communities; in building trust 
with diasporas in order to keep them safe from targeting; 
and in shutting down the networks of enablers, like private 
spyware contractors, that facilitate attacks on dissidents 
and encourage the spread of dangerous digital tools. To 
confront global authoritarianism, the default posture should 
be to deepen democratic solidarity within democracies and 
with those living in non-democracies, instead of trying to cut 
ourselves off from them.
Better defenses against transnational 
repression are a matter of 
strengthening and increasing 
connections, not cutting them.
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The Digital Transnational Repression Toolkit, and 
Its Silencing Effects
 
by Marcus Michaelsen
In summer 2018, the smartphone of a man named Omar     Abdulaziz was infected with a powerful spyware. The 
Pegasus surveillance tool, produced by the Israeli NSO Group, 
gave the attackers access to Abdulaziz’s personal files, emails, 
and messages; they were able to monitor his communications 
and movements. A Saudi political activist living in Canada, 
Omar Abdulaziz was a close associate of Jamal Khashoggi, an 
outspoken journalist who had left Saudi Arabia for the United 
States in 2017 after falling out of favor with the authorities. 
Both men frequently discussed the human rights situation in 
their home country, and together they started developing a 
project for social media campaigns against Saudi government 
propaganda. A few months after the hacking of Abdulaziz’s 
phone, Khashoggi was murdered in the Saudi consulate in 
Istanbul, in an operation coordinated by high-level officials 
of the government in Riyadh, most likely even Crown Prince 
Mohammed Bin Salman himself.1
Oppressive rulers have time and again resorted to murder 
to get rid of exiled political opponents. But, in the case of 
Khashoggi, the crime was prepared with the help of twenty-
first-century surveillance technology, which NSO Group 
may have sold to more than 45 countries around the world.2 
An investigation by The Citizen Lab, a research institute at 
Marcus Michaelsen is a senior post-doctoral researcher in the Law, Science, Technology and Society (LSTS) research group at Vrije 
Universiteit Brussel, Belgium.
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Digital technologies have given 
authoritarian governments new tools 
to control, silence, and punish dissent 
across borders.
the University of Toronto, established that the spyware on 
Abdulaziz’s smartphone was indeed operated from Saudi 
Arabia.3 It had also been used to infiltrate the devices of 
other Saudi human rights defenders based abroad4 as well as 
potential foreign critics, such as the New York Times Middle 
East correspondent Ben Hubbard.5 Digital technologies have 
given authoritarian governments new tools to control, silence, 
and punish dissent across borders. They enable regimes 
to monitor and respond to the activities of political exiles 
and diaspora communities with greater scope and speed, 
reducing the costs of extraterritorial political control. Digital 
technologies have thus become essential components in the 
toolkit of transnational repression.
Civil society has certainly benefited from digital technologies 
to inform, collaborate, and mobilize. For diaspora activists 
engaging for political change in their country of origin, digital 
technologies are key to communicate with contacts at home, 
maintain professional relations, and advocate against rights 
violations. Yet, as digital security researcher John Scott-
Railton puts it, for civil society, “the capacity to connect has 
vastly outpaced the ability to secure.”6 Activists’ reliance on 
digital platforms and social media creates multiple points 
of exposure that authoritarian regimes exploit to prepare, 
deliver, and intensify threats across borders. Digital attacks via 
malware, online harassment, and disinformation campaigns 
are often intertwined with more traditional methods of 
transnational repression, such as pressure on families inside 
the country, smear campaigns in state media, or, as the 
Khashoggi case demonstrates, even assassinations. 
This piece describes widespread methods of digital 
transnational repression, as well as their constraining 
effects on diaspora activism. It mainly draws on a project 
investigating digital threats against exiled activists from Iran, 
Syria, and Egypt, but it is also informed by broader research 
into the practices and trends of extraterritorial authoritarian 
rule.7 The following outlines the ways in which digital 
surveillance, hacking attacks, and online harassment affect the 
freedom, autonomy, and privacy of activists by encouraging 
self-censorship and by creeping into their ties and networks. 
The conclusion gives recommendations on how to curtail 
the impact of digitally enabled transnational repression and 
strengthen the resilience of diaspora activists. 
From covert monitoring to targeted threats
Digital communication technologies expose diaspora activists 
to monitoring and surveillance from regime authorities. As 
avid social media users, activists leave online traces about 
their activities travel, conference participations, family 
members, friends, and collaborators. With professional 
and personal identities converging on social media profiles, 
security agents find ample opportunity to gather so-called 
open-source intelligence: publicly available information 
that can be used to manipulate and pressure targeted 
persons.8 Activists’ contacts with colleagues and relatives 
inside the home country create an additional opportunity 
for intercepting confidential communications as messages 
travel, at least partly, through infrastructure under regime 
control. Intelligence agencies also monitor the programs 
of international and exiled media to track the work of 
journalists and activists’ media appearances. Human rights 
defenders from Syria and Egypt, for instance, understood 
that their participation in the Arabic-language programs of 
foreign media stations had put them on the radar of security 
agents after their parents and fellow activists at home were 
interrogated.9 
Civil society activists have become increasingly aware of their 
digital security and rely on encryption, anonymous browsing, 
and other protections. In response, however, state actors 
resort to more aggressive measures of targeted surveillance.10 
By penetrating computers, mobile devices, email, and social 
media accounts, they aim to gain access to confidential 
communications and contacts. Attacks often involve some 
form of social engineering, with perpetrators working to 
trick targets into opening a malicious link or attachment by 
impersonating a friend or an organization associated with 
their field of expertise.11 Such phishing attempts have been 
delivered via invitations to seminars, files on human rights 
violations, and interview requests, not only through email 
but also in messages on Facebook, WhatsApp, and other 
channels.12 Once successfully executed, these operations 
provide remote access to a target’s device or reveal sensitive 
passwords.13 
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Digital attacks via malware, online 
harassment, and disinformation 
campaigns are often intertwined 
with more traditional methods of 
transnational repression.
A number of repressive governments have engaged in large-
scale phishing campaigns against civil society, both inside 
and outside their territory.14 Not all governments can afford 
or have access to the advanced commercial surveillance 
technology that a growing global market offers. Instead, 
they rely on techniques of cybercrime and open-source 
malware. But a lack of sophisticated tools and expertise is 
compensated for by assiduous information gathering and 
target manipulation—tasks that the intelligence organizations 
of authoritarian regimes are well versed in. Attacks build 
on the ties among activists to unravel entire groups and 
networks.15 In order to encircle high-profile targets, regime 
agents try to infiltrate the accounts of lesser-known and 
inexperienced users in activist networks—or even family 
members. A prominent Iranian women’s rights campaigner 
recalled how she was contacted in London through the 
Facebook profile of her niece from Iran, which had apparently 
been hacked by security agents, in order to reveal the access 
credentials for her own social media accounts. Security 
agents also use the online identities of individuals arrested 
inside the country to swiftly approach their international 
contacts before the arrest becomes public.16 
Other than surveillance, authoritarian regimes use online 
harassment, disinformation, and smear campaigns to 
pressure and silence outspoken dissidents abroad. As much 
as social media help diaspora activists to circulate alternative 
information and opinion, these platforms can also turn into 
a toxic environment for abuse and threats. In campaigns that 
aim to undermine their credibility and taint their reputation, 
journalists and human rights defenders are portrayed as 
liars, accused of working for foreign powers, or attacked on 
moral grounds.17 These campaigns also exert psychological 
pressure, intimidating with threats of physical violence, 
assassination, and arrest upon return to the country.18 
Female journalists and activists are particularly targeted with 
degrading, misogynistic, and sexually violent insults.19 Threats 
are also issued against in-country family members. An Iranian 
journalist based in Washington, DC, reported that, in an online 
comment under one of her articles, she was warned that her 
uncle in Tehran might have an accident, even mentioning his 
home address. 
Some of these attacks may come organically from regime 
supporters, but others are clearly government coordinated. 
Russia, China, Turkey, and many others have organized 
groups of trolls to be unleashed against critics in concerted 
campaigns.20 These “electronic flies,” as pro-regime social 
media accounts were dubbed by Saudi-Arabian activists, 
diffuse propaganda and even take over the identities of 
government opponents to disseminate disinformation 
under their name.21 Moreover, regimes abuse the features 
of social media to drown out topics and manipulate online 
discussions. Automated bots and fake accounts amplify 
Twitter hashtags promoting regime positions or hijack those 
of the opposition.22
In their efforts to shut down online criticism and alternative 
information, regimes not only take aim at individuals in the 
diaspora but also at the websites of media and civil society 
organizations based abroad. Although these publications are 
often already blocked for audiences in the home country 
of activists, they also come under more aggressive attacks. 
Regime-affiliated hackers, such as the self-proclaimed 
Syrian Electronic Army23 or Iranian threat actors,24 have 
disrupted the services of media and opposition websites 
with defacements and Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) 
campaigns. Facebook profiles of civil society organizations get 
blocked after being flagged in massive false reports of their 
violating the rules of the platform. Members of an Egyptian 
human rights campaign based in Turkey mentioned that their 
Facebook event for European-wide protests against President 
Sisi was taken down after government supporters flocked 
together to report the page as sexual harassment. 
Activists point out that all these attempts to disable the 
online expression of diaspora and exiled communities often 
increase in times of political tension, protests, or elections.
The silencing effects of digital 
transnational repression 
By targeting dissidents and critics abroad, authoritarian 
regimes aim to extend the influence of their security 
apparatus across borders and impose additional costs on the 
activities of transnational civil society. With their arsenal of 
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ongoing regime surveillance pushes 
many activists towards self-censorship. 
digital threats, regime agents can pressure activists into self-
restraint, undermine their ties to the home country, and put 
them under extreme tension and stress.
The knowledge or assumption of ongoing regime surveillance 
pushes many activists towards self-censorship. The 
uncertainty about the capabilities of monitoring authorities 
and the scope of their activities clearly has a chilling effect. 
Egyptian human rights defenders who organized a protest 
during one of President Sisi’s visits to Germany explained 
that some group members participated only in disguise, 
wearing sunglasses, hats, or even a wig, for fear of being 
photographed by security agents or pictures of the event 
circulating online. Other activists abstain from media 
appearances or carefully weigh their statements when 
participating in public events so as not to catch the attention 
of regime authorities. 
Fear for relatives and colleagues forces many exiles to 
carefully manage their ties to the home country. In case 
their communications are being monitored, some activists 
circumnavigate critical topics in their conversations; others 
deliberately refrain from collaborating with in-country 
contacts. In any case, they forgo a key resource: the ability 
to gather authentic information from the ground to leverage 
against the regime in international media and advocacy 
organizations. An Iranian journalist working for a diaspora 
news website explained that he had given up on many 
connections that would have helped him to stay in touch 
with the country. “I am not only losing friends but also 
access to information sources,” he said. “The quality of my 
work suffers.”25 
The threat of targeted surveillance and other intrusions 
puts activists under pressure to effectively protect their 
contacts and communications. Not only do they have 
to stay up to date with the rapidly evolving methods of 
attack and deception, but they also make daily security 
decisions knowing they are up against resourceful state 
actors. The complexity of today’s digital tools and platforms 
further complicates any understanding of the technical 
underpinnings of the threats they might be facing. Activists 
often feel uncertain in choosing the right tools and layers of 
protection. A Syrian digital security trainer based in Germany 
pointed out that this constant tension could lead to a 
“security paralysis”: “If you think about all the possibilities of 
getting hacked, then it can result in this attitude: OK, I will get 
hacked anyway.”26 
The risk of mental stress and burnout is even higher for 
activists targeted by online harassment and hate speech. 
A Syrian journalist and trainer working to support female 
journalists explained that colleagues who had gone through a 
wave of trolling and threats online felt physically affected and 
were “thinking twice” before voicing their opinion again. As a 
result, the number of outspoken women in Syrian opposition 
media and civil society networks had decreased.27 
Reaching across borders with the digital tools of transnational 
repression, authoritarian regimes are able to intervene 
in activists’ everyday routines and constrain some of the 
dynamics, impacts, and outreach of diaspora activism. Digital 
threats are often carried out with little chance to identify 
perpetrators and hold them to account. Moreover, regimes 
can escalate these threats into other forms of transnational 
repression in the attempt to punish exiled dissidents for 
crossing a red line and shut them up. After gathering material 
on the media campaign of a human rights advocate, for 
example, they may decide to interrogate her parents in the 
home country. They may also use a journalist’s intercepted 
private communications for slander in state-controlled 
media. The methods in the toolkit of transnational repression 
are clearly intertwined and build upon each other. Digital 
technologies therefore extend the scope and scale of 
repressive practices against political exiles. 
Countering digital transnational repression
To support activists in mitigating the risks of digital threats 
from repressive state actors, it is important to build their 
digital resilience, constrain the proliferation of surveillance 
technology, and involve the institutions and resources of 
societies hosting exiles and diasporas. 
With ties across countries and communities, exiled human 
rights defenders and journalists are part of transnational 
networks in which a successful attack against the weakest 
link could lead to severe consequences for all involved. 
Consequently, the resilience and security of these activists 
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should be thought of in terms of 
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should be thought of in terms of relationships and networks. 
Risk awareness and knowledge on fundamental practices of 
digital security within civil society have certainly increased 
within civil society. Yet activists from authoritarian contexts 
operate in an environment of swiftly shifting technical 
and political risks, relying on commercial applications not 
designed for high-risk users. One-time trainings are not 
enough to equip individuals and organizations against 
emerging threats to their information security. 
It is therefore vital to build forms of long-term 
accompaniment embedding activists and their organizations 
in arrangements of persistent support and advice. Strong 
communities of practice will make it easier to share 
information on threats and provide emergency response 
and assistance, as well as education on information 
security. Building coalitions to connect larger, international 
organizations with smaller, local groups and regional networks 
will allow support to be properly and rapidly scaled, while also 
offering natural and trusted contact points for activists on 
the frontlines. 
The global spread of intrusive surveillance technology has 
caused serious harm to civil society worldwide. It should 
be constrained. Saudi Arabia’s targeting of dissidents 
abroad exemplifies how authoritarian powerholders abuse 
sophisticated spyware to violate human rights, within and 
beyond their territories. NSO Group, the company behind 
the surveillance tool deployed against Omar Abdulaziz and 
fellow activists, is but one household name within a thriving 
and shadowy private industry.28 David Kaye, UN Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right 
to freedom of opinion and expression, considered the 
threat of commercial surveillance technology so grave that 
he has called for a moratorium on its global sale, transfer, 
and use until rigorous human rights safeguards have been 
put in place.29 
Strict rules and independent oversight are needed to 
bring transparency and accountability into the market for 
spyware. Companies should follow due diligence procedures 
throughout the entire chain of development and sales; export 
licenses should be made conditional upon independent 
human rights review. Government use of surveillance 
technology needs to be subject to public debate and 
critical investigation, and there must be mechanisms for 
sanctions and redress in cases of abuse. Companies providing 
surveillance tools that interfere with the rights of targets 
should be named and shamed, and their deceptive practices 
targeted by strategic litigation.30
Political emigrants who feel harassed and threatened from 
their home regimes should get the support of the societies 
they have turned to in order to escape repression in the first 
place. The media and human rights organizations can play 
an important role in documenting and raising awareness 
on practices of transnational repression. Governments 
in democratic host societies should be more alert to the 
methods of authoritarian rulers exporting repression abroad. 
Some countries have developed legal instruments to penalize 
more blatant transgressions, such as the abuse of Interpol 
or refugee espionage. But law enforcement agencies should 
be enabled to deal with the broader range of threats too. 
Cybercrime laws, for instance, could be used to thwart 
targeted surveillance and hacking attacks on civil society.
With a deep understanding of their home country, as well 
as contacts to international organizations, media, and policy 
circles, exiled activists occupy a strategic position to challenge 
unaccountable and illiberal regimes from afar. Authoritarian 
powerholders seek to silence these voices, building on 
methods such as surveillance, hacking devices, and online 
harassment. They instrumentalize digital technologies to 
amplify their control over citizens and information flows 
beyond borders. As a consequence of their invasive methods, 
civil society’s continued ability to use digital tools to freely 
exchange, coordinate, and organize is in danger. These 
malign practices should be seen as actions undertaken by 
increasingly assertive authoritarian states extending their 
reach to undermine civil liberties abroad. They are a threat to 
human rights, and need to be responded to accordingly. 
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AT HOME AND ABROAD: 
Coercion-by-Proxy as a Tool of Transnational 
Repression
 
by Fiona B. Adamson and Gerasimos Tsourapas 
Transnational authoritarianism is characterized by the    breaking down of the boundaries between state-led 
domestic forms of control over citizens living “at home” 
and long-distance forms of repression targeting those 
who reside “abroad.” When an authoritarian state employs 
strategies of transnational repression, it seeks to coerce 
those living outside its legal borders. Victims of transnational 
repression can include not only prominent individuals, such 
as political exiles, journalists, and émigrés, but also entire 
groups, such as students, labor migrants, or refugees. State-
led forms of transnational repression can also extend to a 
country’s diaspora, including noncitizens with interests in or 
connections to the homeland.
Strategies of transnational repression can target individuals 
abroad via harassment, surveillance, enactment of mobility 
restrictions, or even more serious instances of kidnapping, 
physical attack, or assassination. However, authoritarian 
Fiona Adamson is Associate Professor of International Relations – SOAS, University of London; Gerasimos Tsourapas is Associate 
Professor of Middle East Politics – University of Birmingham
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In effect, states use domestic forms 
of repression as a means of punishing, 
threatening, or controlling those who 
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states may encounter obstacles in their ability to engage in 
direct forms of transnational repression: targeting individuals 
abroad can have high costs when it violates the sovereignty 
of powerful states. It may also raise diplomatic concerns or 
draw unwanted public attention to countries’ human rights 
practices, as well as generate undesired media coverage.
Alternatively, autocracies use strategies that involve long-
distance coercion-by-proxy. In such cases, governments 
operate within their territory and jurisdiction to target 
the family members, associates, or acquaintances of 
individuals living abroad. In effect, states use domestic 
forms of repression as a means of punishing, threatening, or 
controlling those who reside overseas. This can be considered 
a “low cost” form of transnational repression in that it neither 
violates the sovereignty of other states nor is it likely to 
garner significant levels of diplomatic or media attention.
The harassment of dissidents’ family members or 
acquaintances has long been used as a method of political 
control in authoritarian states: the personal networks of 
dissidents are often investigated or targeted by autocracies’ 
security agencies seeking to identify, punish, or silence 
political activists. When the Soviet Union stripped dissident 
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn of his citizenship, the daily Izvestiia 
warned that his family members were next.1 Similarly, the 
Marcos regime in the Philippines harassed the family and 
relatives of Filipinos in the United States during the 1970s as a 
means of exercising leverage over them.2
What is new—and of particular interest for understanding 
the dynamics of transnational authoritarianism—is the 
extent to which these strategies have “gone global.” For 
one, international migration has facilitated citizens’ mobility 
into and out of autocratic states.3 At the same time, new 
information and communications technologies (ICTs) have 
led to the globalization of many aspects of domestic politics, 
and the rise of diaspora politics.4 Diasporic activism operates 
largely outside the jurisdiction of the state of origin and has 
therefore often been assumed to be a space of opportunity 
for political opposition movements and groups, where they 
can operate without interference from homeland state 
authorities.5 
Yet, the transnationalization of politics has been accompanied 
by the transnationalization of family ties, social relations, and 
social networks, which perversely has provided an additional 
source of leverage for states to engage in transnational 
repression. New forms of digital surveillance—such as 
monitoring social media accounts, private communications, 
and text messages—mean that authoritarian states can 
quickly identify the ties between activists abroad and family 
members and acquaintances “back home.” Thus, whereas 
actors in the diaspora may be outside the direct reach of 
repressive states, their friends and relatives can still become 
targets of state coercion-by-proxy.6
In order to understand this dimension of transnational 
repression, we first examine the ways in which states 
employ coercion-by-proxy strategies—as instruments of 
punishment, deterrence, compellence, and control. We then 
discuss the global scope of such strategies and their range 
of targets, before reflecting on possible means of addressing 
this challenge.
Coercion-by-Proxy as a Strategy of 
Transnational Repression
Coercion-by-proxy constitutes the actual or threatened use 
of physical or other sanctions against an individual within the 
territorial jurisdiction of a state, for the purpose of repressing 
a target individual residing outside its territorial jurisdiction. 
It may involve visible, high-intensity tactics based on the 
use of violence, such as imprisonment, physical attacks, 
disappearances, or even assassination; it may also include less 
visible, low-intensity tactics, such as threats, surveillance, or 
restrictions on an individual’s freedoms. 
Coercion-by-proxy is used by a variety of authoritarian 
states and operates according to a range of logics, including 
punishment, deterrence, compellence, and control.7 
Punishment involves retribution for acts committed 
by targets abroad; deterrence involves using threats of 
punishment to prevent actions by targets abroad, thus 
increasing their perceived costs; compellence involves using 
threats of punishment in order to coerce targets abroad into 
specific behaviors or actions. Taken together, these three 
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logics of coercion-by-proxy extend autocracies’ control over 
those abroad by normalizing group-level self-censorship and 
self-policing across the diaspora.
Dana Moss has defined “proxy punishment” as “the 
harassment, physical confinement, and/or bodily harm of 
relatives in the home-country as a means of information 
gathering and retribution against dissidents abroad.”8 
Punishment involves the targeting of families or relatives 
in the homeland in retaliation for specific actions taken by 
dissidents, opposition members, journalists, or other key 
figures in the diaspora. In the case of Egyptian activist Wael 
Ghonim, for instance, the arrest of his brother came a few 
days after Wael Ghonim rejected a request by the Egyptian 
embassy in Washington, DC, to “go silent or work with 
them.”9 His is not an isolated case, however. Between 2016 
and 2019, twenty-nine Egyptian journalists and media workers, 
as well as political and human rights activists living abroad, 
had family members in Egypt targeted by the regime.10 
Elsewhere in the Middle East, when Mohammed al-Fazari, an 
Omani human rights defender and blogger, defied a travel 
ban and sought asylum in the United Kingdom, authorities 
targeted his family: in 2015, his brother was detained for three 
weeks without charge while, in 2017, al-Fazari’s family was 
barred from traveling abroad.11
An additional variant of coercion-by-proxy is the use of 
threats to domestic family or acquaintances as a means of 
either deterring or compelling actions in the diaspora. In 
the first case, autocracies issue warnings and engage in acts 
of intimidation as a preventive form of coercion-by-proxy. 
Deterrence is used to alter the cost-benefit calculations of 
those living abroad by creating fear and anxiety around the 
well-being of their family members in the country of origin. 
For example, North Korea seeks to prevent the defection 
of workers abroad by effectively holding their families 
hostage. Some three thousand North Koreans work in Qatar 
where “almost all of the wages of the workers sent abroad 
are remitted back to Kim Jong-un’s regime.”12 This “global 
moneymaking scheme” for the North Korean regime “takes 
in anywhere from $200 million to $2 billion a year.”13 The 
majority of the workers “are married men with at least one 
child, even better, two children. Of course, the families are 
kept at home as hostages, as insurance to make sure that 
these workers do not defect.” Similarly, the Iranian women’s 
rights activist Mansoureh Shojaee has suggested that people 
are “held hostage in Iran” in order to curtail the activities 
of political activists abroad and to prevent them from 
advocating against human rights violations.14 
Compellence involves the opposite dynamics, namely, the 
use of threats against family members and colleagues in 
order to force an individual to undertake particular actions, 
including halting particular activities. Chinese students in the 
United States have reported that their family members have 
been threatened with the loss of their jobs if the students 
do not cease political activism.15 One Uyghur factory worker 
in the Netherlands stated that Chinese policemen obtained 
his phone number from his relatives in Xinjiang in November 
2014, and forced his brother to call him: then, “they took 
over the phone call and told me that I had to provide 
information on other Uyghurs in the Netherlands. Otherwise 
they would take my brother.”16 This extends beyond 
providing information on other individuals: “The Chinese 
spy services are literally threatening Chinese families,” U.S. 
Senate Intelligence Committee Vice Chairman Mark Warner 
has stated. Echoing FBI Director Christopher Wray’s claim 
that Chinese students are compelled to steal research and 
technological advancements from the United States, Senator 
Warner further asserted, “If your son or daughter does not 
come back [from the U.S.] and come back with intellectual 
property, you the family will be put in jeopardy.”17 
The use of long-distance coercion-by-proxy instruments 
against individuals for the purposes of punishment, 
deterrence, and compellence can all feed into the creation 
of a larger climate of fear and control in the diaspora, 
affecting not just individuals but entire populations. Together 
with other forms of transnational repression, the use or 
threat of punishment-by-proxy can lead to high levels of 
self-censorship and self-policing within the diaspora. Bui 
Thanh Hieu, a Vietnamese blogger living in exile in Germany, 
decided to quit blogging due to the Vietnamese authorities’ 
harassment of relatives back home, including his 86-year-old 
mother, who is currently hospitalized.18 In the case of Syria, 
those who have fled the Assad regime highlight a totalitarian-
style state repression that has produced “a disposition of 
silence . . . carried beyond the homeland.”19
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The Global Scope of Coercion-by-Proxy
State-led coercion-by-proxy strategies that are designed to 
punish, deter, compel, and, ultimately, control individuals or 
populations abroad are widespread and characterized by their 
global scope. An increase in states’ abilities to engage in long-
distance surveillance and harassment, coupled with a global 
resurgence of illiberal politics, suggests the need for greater 
attention to the use of coercion-by-proxy as a strategy of 
transnational repression.
One group of actors that is frequently targeted includes 
political exiles and regime dissenters. For example, when 
Uyghur political activist Rushan Abbas spoke at a think tank 
in Washington, DC, about the repression faced by Uyghur 
Muslims in China, her sister and aunt in Xinjiang disappeared 
within a week. Abbas is one of many Uyghur Americans who 
have had family members in China detained or harassed 
as part of what appears to be a coordinated strategy to 
silence political activists in the Uyghur diaspora.20 Rwandan 
political exiles have expressed concern about their private 
communications with family members and acquaintances 
being intercepted as part of state strategies of harassment 
and leading to subsequent targeting of individuals back 
home.21 Relatives of Emirati political dissidents have faced 
restrictions on their access to any employment opportunities 
or higher education: “Whenever the family tried to dig deeper 
to understand why the government was denying access to 
a service or holding an application pending indefinitely,” 
one Emirati dissident abroad reported, “they would be told, 
verbally only, that the obstruction was happening at the 
state security level.”22 Kurdish political activists in Europe 
have reported cases in which their relatives have been 
threatened or attacked, including at least one case of the 
murder of elderly parents by suspected government-linked 
death squads.23
At the same time, whistleblowers and journalists writing 
on homeland politics can also become targets of state-led 
coercion-by-proxy strategies. The exiled Turkish journalist 
Can Dündar claimed that his wife in Turkey was being treated 
“like a hostage” by the Turkish state, unable to leave Turkey 
and fearing for her life,24 a story that matches reports by 
a number of journalists whose relatives were detained or 
harassed after they fled Turkey.25 In the case of Europe-
based Tajik journalist Humayra Bakhtiyar, police called her 
father to convince his daughter to return to Tajikistan or 
face losing his job as a schoolteacher, as he had “no moral 
right to teach children if he was unable to raise his own 
daughter properly.”26 The Iranian regime targeted the father 
of journalist Masih Alinejad, who campaigns for women’s 
rights online. As she reported, “nine times they took him 
and told him that his daughter is morally corrupt, that she 
is against Islam, she works with Israel against our country. 
My father doesn’t talk to me anymore.”27 The exiled Egyptian 
whistleblower Mohamed Ali has produced videos on alleged 
government corruption, which have stirred numerous 
protests in Egypt. In response to his first video, the regime 
raided his company’s offices in Cairo, arresting at least seven 
of his employees; following his second video, two of his 
cousins living in Alexandria were reported missing. Ali’s father 
subsequently appeared on a progovernment television show 
denouncing his son.28
Coercion-by-proxy can also be used to target and control 
entire groups abroad, such as students, labor migrants, and 
ordinary members of the diaspora. A Chinese student in 
Vancouver argued, “We self-police ourselves. . . . Everybody 
is scared. Just this fear, I think creating the fear, it actually 
works.”29 In Turkish communities in Europe, ordinary 
members of the diaspora often live in fear of being spied on 
by their compatriots, who have been encouraged to do so by 
the Turkish regime. This creates particular challenges for dual 
nationals. In the Netherlands, there have been several cases 
of dual Turkish-Dutch nationals traveling to Turkey and having 
their travel documents confiscated. In one case, a recently 
divorced woman had traveled to Turkey with her son and 
had her travel documents cancelled after suspecting that her 
ex-husband had reported her to a tip-off hotline as revenge. 
One Dutch official claimed, “We’re doing everything we  
can. . . . It’s difficult, because Turkey regards them as Turkish 
citizens who have to abide by Turkish law.”30
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
As autocracies develop new means of exercising power over 
populations abroad, their use of transnational strategies 
of coercion-by-proxy poses a number of challenges for 
policymakers in democratic states, human rights actors, 
and international legal understandings of refuge, asylum, 
and protection. Existing international protection regimes 
operate according to state-centric assumptions, in which 
state sovereignty is identified with territoriality and national 
borders are assumed to demarcate legal jurisdictions in ways 
that offer refuge and asylum to persecuted individuals fleeing 
authoritarian states. Yet, the examples provided in this piece 
show that the crossing of national borders does not mean 
that individual dissidents and exiles—or entire groups living 
outside a state’s territorial boundaries, such as international 
students, labor migrants, or ordinary diaspora members—
are necessarily free from the influence of state actors in 
their homeland.
Some human rights reports, including that published by the 
U.S. Department of State, have recently added categories 
that directly address other examples of state-led forms 
of transnational repression.31 But the use of coercion-by-
proxy—in which the immediate victims of state coercion 
are domestic family members and acquaintances, but the 
ultimate targets of the actions are those who live abroad—
presents a more complicated blurring of how authoritarian 
practices “at home” relate to diaspora politics “abroad.” In a 
highly interconnected world, it may be necessary for human 
rights organizations and others to radically rethink traditional 
reporting mechanisms and legal remedies that focus 
primarily on states. One alternative to the country-based 
report format would be for human rights actors to think 
more in terms of “authoritarian practices” that transcend 
state borders.32 A practice-based approach to human rights 
violations can shed greater light on the spatial and legal 
complexities that characterize contemporary human rights 
abuses. This includes the ways in which liberal and illiberal 
states, rather than operating in wholly separate spheres, are 
increasingly entangled.33
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The Importance of Defending Diaspora Activism 
for Democracy and Human Rights
 
by Dana M. Moss
Activists in authoritarian states face steep costs in working       for democracy and human rights, and for many, their 
only hope to survive is to escape abroad. When survivors 
of state violence secure refuge in democracies, they gain 
the opportunity to continue their activism and express their 
voices in new ways. Diaspora activists, in turn, play a number 
of important roles in the global fight for transparency, 
freedom, and human dignity. As this report details, these 
roles include spreading awareness about regime abuses, 
assisting dissidents working on the ground, launching 
protests, pursuing justice, demanding that their host-country 
governments pressure sending states on issues of rights and 
reform, and empowering diaspora communities themselves.
Yet, while diaspora activists—which I define broadly here as 
any émigré, exile, refugee, or emigrant advocating for social, 
economic, and political change in their country of origin—are 
relatively safe compared to those in their home countries, the 
operation and effects of transnational repression can curb 
their freedoms, and even threaten their physical safety. As the 
other authors in this collection elaborate, regimes are in fact 
widely guilty of repressing their diasporas by kidnapping and 
Dana M. Moss is Assistant Professor of Sociology, University of Notre Dame, United States of America.
Syrians living in Istanbul protest the regime of Bashar Essad in front of Syrian Consulate in Istanbul,Turkey. Editorial credit: Sadik Gulec / 
Shutterstock.com
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assassinating opponents abroad, surveilling and monitoring 
their activities, withdrawing student scholarships and 
confiscating their passports, controlling their lawful civic 
engagement, and punishing their family members at home. 
So, while diaspora activism can be impactful, all of these 
tactics can effectively deter, silence, and punish independent 
voices abroad. 
This essay discusses how diaspora activism promotes 
democracy and human rights, the negative effects of 
transnational repression on their mobilizations, and the 
critical need for authorities to protect at-risk communities.
The Roles of Diaspora Activists in Fighting 
for Democracy and Human Rights
Diaspora activists perform a number of vital roles in the 
fight for democracy and human rights.1 One of their major 
contributions is to publicize information that regimes seek to 
repress. Inspired by the onset of the regional uprising known 
as the Arab Spring, for instance, diaspora activists from 
countries such as Libya, Yemen, and Syria undertook a wide 
range of supportive roles in the uprisings.2 These included 
holding teach-ins at universities, speaking to the media, and 
using the internet to document events on the ground.3 This 
work often takes place in partnership with dissidents working 
in the home country, who relay information from areas off-
limits to foreign journalists to their contacts in the diaspora.4 
By connecting dissidents to global media outlets directly, 
diaspora activists help those under siege to overcome their 
isolation, inform the global public about events that remain 
heavily repressed and censored, and provide an alternative to 
the regime’s monopoly over information.
Another tactic used by diaspora activists to raise awareness 
is to protest against visiting dignitaries, such as during Turkish 
president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Washington, DC, and 
Rwandan president Paul Kagame’s speech in Brussels in 2017.5 
Doing so refutes the regimes’ frequent claim that autocrats 
have the universal support of their people. Protests draw 
attention to regime repression and crimes against humanity, 
which calls leaders’ legitimacy into question. Protests also 
provide a counter-presence to pro-regime demonstrations, 
which are often coordinated by regimes in advance to create 
positive publicity and enforce loyalty. From the Libyan 
regime of Muammar al-Gaddafi to China under Xi Jinping, 
officials have been known to pay for students to provide an 
adoring welcome to visiting leaders.6 Accordingly, the physical 
presence of critical voices on the streets brings visibility to 
those with rightful grievances against dictatorships.  
Diaspora activists also play an integral role in the pursuit of 
justice. By taking their claims to court, diaspora activists lead 
initiatives to prosecute torturers and war criminals. As scholar 
Claire Beaugrand writes, “in October 2014, a Bahraini who 
was granted asylum in the United Kingdom obtained a court 
decision stating that the son of the King of Bahrain, educated 
in Sandhurst and frequently traveling to the UK, did not enjoy 
state immunity from prosecution over a torture claim. This 
established that even an offense committed outside of the 
country can still be prosecuted in the UK.”7 Syrian refugees in 
Germany are likewise providing key testimony to prosecute 
members of the Assad regime for mass torture.8 The ability 
of these dissidents and survivors to pursue justice is critical 
for upholding the rule of law and human rights norms. It also 
signals to abusers that they are not untouchable.
Diaspora activists also play a key role in demanding that 
host-country governments implement democratic and 
human rights reforms. Diaspora testimony from the Uyghur 
community, for instance, undergirded a widely supported 
resolution in the European Parliament (2019/2945[RSP]) on 
abuses by the Chinese regime, which
expressed deep concern over reports of harassment of 
Uyghurs abroad by the Chinese authorities in order to 
force them to act as informants against other Uyghurs, 
return to Xinjiang or remain silent about the situation 
there, sometimes by detaining their family members. 
The resolution calls on the EU to step up its efforts to 
protect Uyghur residents and EU citizens in member 
states from harassment and intimidation by the Chinese 
authorities.9  
Diaspora associations and organizations additionally 
address suffering in their places of origin. Syrian diaspora 
organizations have been working tirelessly to deliver 
ambulances and medicine and perform trauma surgeries 
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in the country’s liberated zones, improve sanitation and 
water-delivery systems, staff and fund schools, and provide 
shelter and generators to refugees.10 This is especially 
important because the Assad regime has hampered delivery 
by the International Red Crescent, preventing aid from being 
delivered to civilians in so-called enemy zones.11 As regulated 
not-for-profit organizations, diaspora groups help to fill in this 
gap, both by channeling donations to emergency responders 
and working directly on the ground to assist survivors. 
Diaspora remittances therefore can provide literal lifelines for 
people suffering in their homelands and in refugee camps.  
Diaspora organizations, in turn, empower the diaspora 
itself. The Syrian American Council, for instance, trains its 
members in how to lobby their elected representatives and 
encourages Syrian Americans to register to vote. A Saudi 
organization called ALQST, founded by regime defector Yahya 
Assiri, conducts seminars aimed at educating fellow Saudis 
about their human rights. Their websites also provide the 
confidential means for Saudis residing anywhere in the world 
to report regime abuses and receive help. Diaspora activists 
from places like Eritrea also run their own media campaigns 
on cable television or social media.12 It comes as no surprise 
that diaspora organizations can facilitate the engagement 
of their members with democratic norms, endowing 
“immigrants with a renewed sense of efficacy and self-worth 
that facilitates their integration into the political institutions 
of their new country,” as migration scholars Luis Eduardo 
Guarnizo, Alejandro Portes, and William Haller argue.13 
The Effects of Transnational Repression on 
Diaspora Activism
Despite the seeming prevalence of diaspora activism, 
however, my and others’ research demonstrates that 
transnational repression simultaneously erects a barrier 
to engaging lawful activism.14 As discussed above by other 
authors in this collection, tactics used by foreign governments 
to repress their critics abroad—including assassinations, the 
proxy punishment of family members, surveillance on- and 
offline, death and rape threats, and slander, among other 
means15—cast a long shadow over diaspora communities. 
While some are willing to risk or endure these costs, activists 
also report that many of their co-nationals are too fearful to 
risk retribution. 
Identifying exactly what percentage of a given diaspora 
is effectively cowed into silence is a major challenge. 
Transnational repression can pressure diaspora members 
into appearing “as if” they are loyal to regimes, to borrow 
Professor Lisa Wedeen’s phrasing.16 As a 2020 Amnesty 
International report details, “Uyghurs living in [the] diaspora 
overseas have generally been very reluctant to talk about 
their detained or missing relatives in Xinjiang, fearing possible 
retaliation against either themselves or other relatives in 
Xinjiang. About two-thirds of those who spoke to Amnesty 
International requested anonymity, citing fear of reprisals 
from the authorities.” Accordingly, fear of reporting 
one’s true opinions—even to outside researchers touting 
anonymous surveys—can prevent diaspora members from 
revealing critical and nuanced views.
When fears of transnational repression are widely pervasive, 
activists report that their co-nationals become reluctant to 
join organizations promoting progressive change. After the 
initial founding of the Syrian American Council in 2005, for 
example, activists reported that recruiting Syrian Americans 
into the organization was virtually impossible. As a California-
based organizer said in an interview, 
I tried contacting a few people to encourage them 
to be part of it. Not a single person that I know who I 
contacted agreed to. . . . Every time they talked to people, 
people didn’t want to do it because they understood . . . 
the consequence would’ve been very severe if you were 
visiting Syria or [the Syrian Intelligence] might visit your 
family members in Syria.17
 
Transnational repression also perpetuates mistrust between 
diaspora members because individuals worry about being 
subjected to surveillance. Mounting evidence demonstrates 
that individuals from China have indeed been coerced into 
spying on their co-nationals.18 As Amnesty International 
reports, “Not knowing who among them might be reporting 
back to Chinese security agents plants seeds of suspicion 
and mistrust that take root and further feed the sense of 
isolation and fear.”19 This curbs the practice of free assembly 
and association, and the circulation of ideas between diaspora 
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members, severely inhibiting their potential to act as a 
collective force for democracy and human rights.
It is no wonder that diaspora members report engaging 
in self-censorship.20 Tragically, this can lead victims of 
transnational repression to purposefully avoid alerting local 
law enforcement about threats to their personal safety. One 
such Syrian living in Sweden told the newspaper Dagens 
Nyheter that “she knows of 17 other people who have 
received threats. All of them suspect that the Syrian regime 
is behind them but few have dared to report the incidents 
to the Swedish authorities.”21 Transnational repression 
also impacts the ability of diaspora members to engage in 
independent journalism. One Toronto-based journalist for a 
Chinese-language newspaper, for instance, reported that her 
parents in China were harassed for her work, and that “I don’t 
feel there is free speech here. I can’t report freely.”22 
Regime threats also curb the ability of foreign universities 
to serve as places of free thought and independent learning. 
In Australia, Chinese-born lecturers and students have 
suffered repercussions because of comments they made 
in classrooms, and in the United States, a graduating senior 
named Yang Shuping was harassed for praising the University 
of Maryland in College Park for teaching her about “free 
speech.”23 As a Foreign Policy report recently revealed, staff 
at the Chinese embassy in Washington, DC, praised a group of 
students from the local regime-approved student group for 
censuring Shuping.24 All of the students who spoke to Foreign 
Policy about state interference on university campuses 
requested anonymity out of concern for themselves and 
their families.
Lastly, transnational repression makes attending even 
the most banal public demonstration a potentially high-
risk activity. In Washington, DC, Kurdish protesters and 
local police were violently attacked by Erdoğan’s Turkish 
bodyguards during the president’s visit in May 2017. Some 
demonstrators require police protection just to hold silent 
vigils. In one of many cases, Abdurehim Gheni, a well-known 
Uyghur activist in the Netherlands, has been physically 
harassed and received death threats from persons suspected 
of working with the Chinese intelligence services.25 
Threats against the exercise of basic rights and freedoms 
not only harm individuals but effectively force the majority 
of a diaspora into silence. This places the burden of diaspora 
activism on the shoulders of an exiled minority. It also limits 
activism by making their organizations less representative of 
the diverse opinions present within a diaspora community. 
So, while diaspora activism has the potential to flourish in 
democracies, transnational repression can suppress the ability 
for an anti-regime community to work as a force for change.
The Need for Protection
Taken together, diaspora activism plays a critically important 
role in promoting democracy and human rights. However, 
transnational repression not only threatens diaspora 
members’ legal rights and civil liberties but also the rule 
of law, state sovereignty, and international human rights 
norms. It is therefore vital for host-country governments 
to recognize the elevated threats and risks associated with 
diaspora activism so that they can proactively support and 
protect these communities. Local and national enforcement 
agencies need to be made aware of the potential threats 
against diaspora organizations and activists, and communicate 
with community leaders about how to lodge complaints. 
Governments must also provide the fullest possible 
protections to diaspora activists and their organizations 
through legislation, which is needed to sanction regimes for 
atrocities and protect diaspora communities from threats 
and interference. Universities, which often depend financially 
on international students, must be vigilant in ensuring that 
student groups follow the law and that students at risk for 
harassment are protected. Because diaspora activists are 
essential actors in the global struggle for democracy and 
human rights, protecting their civil liberties remains a central 
responsibility of authorities today and in the future.
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The Internationalization of Universities and the 
Repression of Academic Freedom
 
by Saipira Furstenberg, Tena Prelec, and John Heathershaw
Academic freedom1 is at the heart of university life.      It forms the fundamental basis for disseminating 
knowledge and fostering independent thinking of students 
and staff members; it also allows for self-governance and 
academic job security to ensure independence.2 Yet, a recent 
report3 by the University and College Union (UCU) in the 
United Kingdom (UK) highlights that the major elements 
of academic freedom (freedom for teaching and research, 
autonomy, shared governance, and employment protection) 
are in decline. In certain countries, scholars and students 
are frequently persecuted, arrested, or tortured for their 
academic work, research, and publications; in others, the 
threats to academic freedom are more subtle, often driven by 
market dynamics and the increase of a corporate governance 
model of the university. 
The phenomenon of the “internationalization” of 
universities—the increasing quantity and quality of 
international partnerships and transnational ties in research, 
education, and associated activities—is a broadly positive 
force. But these partnerships often link places where 
academics suffer direct and severe threats to places where 
Students gather to call for academic freedom at Hong Kong University as fears grow that Beijing is interfering in the city's education.  
Editorial credit: PHILIPPE LOPEZ/AFP via Getty Images
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influence across borders.
universities are increasingly reliant on income from foreign 
sources. According to Scholars at Risk (SAR), there has been 
an increase of academic persecution around the world: 
between September 2018 and August 2019, there were 324 
attacks on higher-education communities in 56 countries.4 In 
parallel, an erosion of universities’ financial and institutional 
autonomy has been recorded in top liberal democracies.5 
The need for funding has forced many major universities 
to collaborate with governments in authoritarian states, 
whose policies delimit the space for freedom of expression 
and thinking by controlling what is taught, researched, and 
discussed at university campuses.6 
The internationalization of the university presents an 
opportunity for authoritarian states to assert their influence 
across borders. Authoritarian influencing7 in universities 
constitutes an attempt to shape their research and teaching 
agendas and thus threatens the academic integrity of the 
institution. Transnational repression in this context occurs 
when individuals—typically but not exclusively students 
or faculty from an authoritarian state—are subject to 
repressive measures against their academic freedom and 
wider human rights. Drawing on a survey of UK-based 
Area Studies academics,8 this paper aims to shed light 
on how both of these processes can and do take place in 
UK universities as a result of international collaboration 
with authoritarian governments. We explore four areas of 
internationalization that are vulnerable to authoritarian 
influencing and/or transnational repression: international 
partnerships and funding; expatriate students and faculty; 
fieldwork; and overseas campuses. Our findings suggest a 
fraught environment where authoritarian influencing and 
transnational repression combine with market dynamics and 
national security responses to curtail academic freedom. 
International partnerships and funding
Concern regarding internationalization and academic 
freedom involves pressure from foreign governments, upon 
whose funding UK universities may depend via overseas 
students or research partnerships. In recent years, the 
gradual withdrawal of core state funding in higher education 
has driven UK universities to compete in the global market 
for donations and international students’ fees. Since 2010, 
research funding in the UK has fallen by 12.8 percent.9 At the 
same time, funding from foreign sources has increased in 
importance. A significant share of this funding originates from 
authoritarian states. 
The UK’s leading universities have accepted sponsorship from 
authoritarian regimes accused of human rights violations 
and links to terrorism, with hundreds of millions of pounds 
funneled into British higher-education institutions to 
establish research centers and other kinds of partnerships.10 
Such actions, which may first occur as benign, might have 
an outward-facing political agenda to gain international 
respectability. More importantly, they represent new 
mechanisms for authoritarian regimes to influence the 
structures of research and be recognized, informally and 
internationally, as legitimate. 
The universities that are most vulnerable to such mechanisms 
are those relying most heavily on foreign income sources. 
In 2011, the London School of Economics (LSE) infamously 
accepted a £1.5 million donation11 from a charity run by Saif 
al-Islam Gaddafi, son of the late Libyan leader Muammar 
Gaddafi. Meanwhile, Sheikh Dr. Sultan bin Muhammad 
al-Qasimi, the ruler of Sharjah—one of the most conservative 
emirates in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—has given more 
than £8 million to the University of Exeter over the course of 
twenty years.12 In 2012, the University of Cambridge received a 
£3.7 million donation to establish a professorship for Chinese 
development studies, funded by a charity controlled by 
China’s former prime minister Wen Jiabao.13
Such one-off donations, often for capital projects, garner 
headlines. However, a less visible but more prevalent form of 
authoritarian influencing occurs through state scholarship 
programs for study and faculty visits. These are important 
to universities as they support students paying fees at the 
lucrative international fee level. At present, UK universities 
host more than 100,000 Chinese students, which represent 
an important part of universities’ revenue streams.14 Chinese 
authorities, for instance, have threatened to withhold Chinese 
students from the University of Oxford in an unsuccessful bid 
to force the school’s chancellor, Chris Patten, to cancel a visit 
to Hong Kong.15
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A less visible but more prevalent form 
of authoritarian influencing occurs 
through state scholarship programs for 
study and faculty visits. 
The risks associated with this double financial dependence 
are multiple. As summarized by one of our survey 
respondents, “these partnerships have financial implications; 
as a result, there is an incentive to keep them in place, 
especially where institutions struggle with other sources of 
funding.” Another respondent remarked that worries about 
the loss of income from fees paid by foreign students push 
universities to “turn a blind eye” towards the behavior of 
authoritarian regimes, while also encouraging staff members 
to avoid sensitive topics—which occurs either overtly (that 
is, being told to avoid certain themes) or through more 
subtle “hints” that result in self-censorship.  While there are 
few examples of overt censorship, the evidence that self-
censorship is increasingly widespread indicates that academic 
freedom is at risk. Without a transparent system of recording 
donations and allowing university faculty and students to hold 
the institution to account, the integrity of the university can 
be called into question.
Expatriate students and faculty
The students and faculty on state scholarship programs, such 
as Kazakhstan’s Bolashak program, are routinely subject to 
surveillance by their home government security services and 
often exercise self-censorship accordingly.16 Unless academic 
freedom is explicitly protected in these arrangements, 
collaborations with authoritarian regimes end up curtailing 
the freedom of academic staff and students to express their 
views on politically and socially sensitive topics, as well as 
their freedom to teach and conduct research on topics that 
are thought to be at odds with the donors’ visions. Violations 
often result in self-censorship, suspensions, or even, in rare 
cases, the loss of jobs. 
Sponsorships by foreign regimes create obligations that 
may encourage UK-based academics to steer their research 
agenda to avoid controversies with their donors. For 
example, a report published by the House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee17 found that Chinese embassies 
put pressure on faculty members to remove critics of 
the Beijing government from academic events or to limit 
speech on politically sensitive topics such as the Hong Kong 
protests.18 In other instances, scholars and foreign students 
suffer from restrictions in the production of academic 
conduct and content, with sometimes vicious retaliations. 
There have been cases of students experiencing surveillance, 
intimidation, and coercive pressure on relatives back home, 
or even legal action taken by authorities to persecute 
academics and critics of the government’s policies.19 In 2016, 
Turkey launched criminal prosecutions against academics, 
including foreign scholars based at UK institutions, who 
signed a petition called “Academics for Peace” criticizing20 the 
military crackdown on Kurdish rebels in southeastern Turkey. 
One of our respondents recounted their experience after 
signing this petition: “Along with 1,128 academics, we were 
accused of supporting terrorism and put on trial. . . . My [UK] 
department was afraid about losing their Turkish partnerships 
after the criminalization of peace activism in Turkey. I have 
been asked not to write on the Kurdish question for a while.” 
Our exploratory survey suggests that these forms of 
direct threats to foreign faculty and students are far more 
widespread than has been reported. The spectrum of 
countries mentioned by respondents also goes beyond 
what we would normally think of fully fledged authoritarian 
states. It includes “very strong pressure placed on UK 
institutions by Israeli embassies and proxies”; cases of Russian 
co-authors pulling out of conference presentations “out of 
fears of repercussion from [their] home university”; Saudi 
Arabian students asked “to report to their embassy once a 
month”; and China’s surveillance of student societies, which 
“influences students’ choices of dissertation topics away from 
controversial ones.” This attitude of Chinese students is, no 
doubt, influenced by real threats, such as the interference 
of the Chinese embassy in the UK (which “instructed some 
Chinese students in response to criticism of the Chinese 
government treatment of Uighurs in Xinjiang”) and even by 
that of the secret services (for example, a China-based PhD 
student warned that there would be “government spies in 
the audience to monitor what he was saying” at a conference 
in the UK). 
However, more common is an indirect threat to academic 
freedom in the form of self-censorship. One academic stated 
that he has “observed self-censorship among state-funded 
Turkish students . . . who avoided making critical comments 
about their country’s politics in front of their Turkish peers 
and were worried about their MA dissertations being read by 
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Many other cases of restriction 
of liberties or even temporary 
detention go unreported due to 
fear of professional and personal 
repercussions.
their funding institution or others in their country of origin.” 
Students from China, too, were said to be “clearly worried 
that they would be reported on by other Chinese students.” 
Sometimes, these faculty would themselves indicate the need 
to tone down criticism of what is taught in the classroom, as 
per this testimony: “I have censored in classes with Chinese 
students as I have received difficult pressure from them not 
to assign anything critical of China.” 
Fieldwork
Restrictions on academic freedom are also found in the 
practice of research and data collection. This may take 
the form of depriving academic critics of their personal 
liberty and individual freedoms or banning those scholarly 
activities that are not aligned with the regime’s vision. 
Scholars have been attacked, killed, detained, or prosecuted 
conducting fieldwork. In May 2018, Matthew Hedges, a British 
doctoral student from Durham University, who was in the 
UAE for a two-week research trip, was arrested at Dubai 
International Airport on suspicion of spying on behalf of 
the British government.21 In November, he was sentenced to 
life imprisonment. Hedges was later granted clemency and 
released. In a similar vein, in August 2019, Iranian authorities 
detained Kameel Ahmady, a dual Iranian-British citizen and 
anthropologist who researched female genital mutilation 
and child marriage, in apparent retaliation for his scholarly 
work.22 These cases closely mirror the killing of the Italian 
Cambridge University doctoral student Giulio Regeni, who 
had traveled to Cairo in 2016 to do research on Egyptian 
trade unions—a politically sensitive subject in the country. His 
body was discovered in a ditch on February 3, 2016, with signs 
of torture.23 Egyptian security forces are suspected of being 
responsible for his disappearance and murder.
Many other cases of restriction of liberties or even temporary 
detention go unreported due to fear of professional and 
personal repercussions, and one such case was reported to 
us confidentially in our survey. Another respondent spoke 
of “numerous instances when international PhD students 
were called by phone (or even summoned) by the police of 
their country, and asked to stop asking questions on a certain 
topic.” Such forms of direct but low-level interference are 
not the sole purview of authoritarian states but can be found 
in the security responses of the UK authorities. One noted 
that “British intelligence, specifically MI5, asked me to secretly 
debrief students returning from China about their Chinese 
contacts,” while others mentioned “Home Office pressure 
regarding activism—perhaps not explicit pressure but 
investigation into [our] activities.” However, it is encouraging 
that none of our respondents reported any pressure by UK 
universities in their fieldwork abroad beyond that of meeting 
the standard university ethics procedures. 
Much more commonplace than these high-profile cases is 
the fact that a large part of the world remains a politically 
unfree environment for academic research, a phenomenon 
increasingly discussed in the academic literature on fieldwork 
in practice.24 Scholars working on sensitive topics are often 
forced to limit the scope of their investigations due to the 
difficulty of obtaining visas or the risk of endangering their 
fieldwork contacts. While conducting fieldwork, foreign 
academics work with local research assistants, translators, 
and other academic partners. However, some governments’ 
formal and informal restrictions may make this dangerous 
or impossible. Local scholars are often subject to state 
surveillance and pressure from authorities.25 
UK-based scholars whose passports offer them a degree of 
protection are also routinely subject to such measures. One 
of our survey respondents reported conducting fieldwork 
in both Western Sahara (a disputed territory between the 
self-proclaimed Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and 
neighboring Morocco) and Morocco. While the pushback in 
Western Sahara—an unrecognized state—was more overt 
(through “visible following and surveillance, threatening 
anonymous calls, theft of mp3 player from luggage”), the 
coercion was more subtle and difficult to prove in Morocco 
proper (including “likely social media surveillance, non-
responsiveness of formerly consolidated contacts which 
suggests some form of blacklisting”). As a result of such 
actions, international partnerships are often curtailed or 
reshaped due to fears of government retaliation.
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Overseas campuses
The internationalization and commercialization of universities 
has increased the outsourcing of higher education abroad. 
A positive trend in itself, the opening of campuses overseas 
has raised a number of controversies due to the choice of 
host countries, which have oftentimes coincided with states 
oppressing civil liberties and human rights. According to data 
compiled by the Cross-Border Education Research Team 
(C-BERT),26 as of 2017, most UK overseas campuses are based 
in China (9), in Malaysia (6), and in Middle Eastern countries 
(11). The establishment of these branches is, in the majority of 
cases, financially subsidized by the foreign government. Yet, 
sometimes this support comes with restrictions on subjects 
to be taught or researched. 
In most cases, the university selects a range of topics to 
be taught that are not controversial, posing no challenge 
to the domestic political or social order. As noted by John 
Nagle, Reader in Sociology at the University of Aberdeen, 
who spent four months as a visiting professor at the UAE’s 
national university: “Rather than encouraging critical thinking, 
education in the UAE rests on a technocratic logic. Education 
is supposed to help its society resolve tricky social problems 
and maintain the status quo.”27 In 2018, the University of 
Nottingham Ningbo China, the first joint-venture university 
in China, removed a foreign academic from its management 
board for being critical of Communist Party–backed 
initiatives.28
These examples demonstrate that the outsourcing of higher 
education to campuses in authoritarian states is typically 
accompanied by a relaxation of standards of academic 
freedom compared to the home university. In the words of 
one of our survey respondents:  
Too often partnerships between UK higher institutions 
and overseas partners involve institutions with strong ties 
to authoritarian governments and contribute to providing 
them with international legitimacy. If this ends up limiting 
the kind of topics or perspectives that can be discussed 
in collaborative research and teaching, or if it influences 
the appointment or treatment of staff, then of course this 
is very problematic. There must be alternative ways to 
support internationalisation and academic collaboration 
that do not make us complicit with repressive regimes.
Conclusion
As the observations above demonstrate, the 
internationalization of higher education has enabled 
authoritarian states to effectively “transnationalize” everyday 
forms of censorship and political repression to students and 
faculty both at home and abroad. Many of these forms of 
influence appear to be indirect, in that they derive from fear 
of direct measures against oneself or one’s family. These 
include fear of the loss of the right to travel, of the right to 
host students, or of the likelihood of receiving donations. 
Evidence remains scattered, and further research on this 
under-studied topic is ongoing by the authors. 
However, what is clear is the value for an authoritarian regime 
to exercise direct and indirect influence outside its national 
territories. The stability of the regime remains the first 
concern of autocrats. Academic freedom, and therefore the 
possibility of intellectual dissent, represent challenges to the 
authoritarian structure. Hence, ideas and movements that 
might compromise the regime, within the nation state as well 
as abroad, are subject to repression. According to such logic, 
the state must constantly reaffirm its dominant position by 
penetrating spaces of critical thinking within and beyond its 
territorial borders.
The risk to academic freedom, however, is not solely from 
such states. As remarked by several of our UK respondents, 
risks “emanate mostly from within, rather than from without”. 
They are created and enhanced by market mechanisms that 
generate unregulated competition between universities 
over the funding they offer. Furthermore, the foreign 
policy establishments of some governments have come to 
identify certain research as a security threat and have begun 
to impose limits on international partnerships.29 Neither 
market forces nor a security-based approach is likely to help 
protect academic freedom from transnational repression 
and authoritarian influencing; more likely, they will make 
matters worse. 
What can be more effective is the establishment of a code of 
conduct – on foreign donations and campuses, on protecting 
expatriate students and faculty, and on training and support 
for fieldworkers – to protect academic freedom in the 
context of internationalization. Ultimately, adoption of these 
common standards and measures must be transparent, 
allowing for a relationship of accountability between 
university leaders and their students and staff.
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